Solution concepts basic operation: from taking over operational responsibility, 24/7 to support when needed (substitution, vacation replacement)
SPDD SPDD selection and startup
In order for Fiori applications to be displayed according to the calling users, appropriate Fiori permissions must be maintained in the PFCG. There are several points to consider. This article discusses the permissions required to launch a Fiori application. In addition, a short explanation is given, how the displayed tiles can be configured in the Fiori launchpad via reels. To run Fiori applications from the launchpad and the permission queries defined in the OData services, the corresponding Fiori permission objects must also be maintained in the PFCG. Here the start permissions for the application's OData service in the backend system as well as permission objects are relevant for the business logic of the OData services used in the application. In general, it is important to know that if Fiori is implemented correctly, permissions must be maintained in the front-end server (call Launchpad, start the tile, etc.) as well as permissions in the back-end server (call the OData services from the backend). This article explains this in more detail.
This makes the technical user the dialogue user and a login in the SAP system is unrestricted. So Johannes logs in with the known password of the RFC user in the production system. Thanks to very extensive permissions, it now has access to all sorts of critical tables, transactions, and programmes in production. With the identity of the RFC user Johannes starts with the technical compromise of the production system... RFC Security: All invented - or everyday threat? Whether a simple trim, altered biometric properties or an encapsulated technical user in the SAP system: the basis of the compromise is the same. A person uses a different identity to gain access and permissions to protected areas. Moreover, the evil in all three stories could have been prevented by pro-activity. When was the last time you thought about the security of your RFC interfaces? Can you say with certainty that all your technical RFC users only have the permissions they actually need? And do you know who exactly knows the passwords of these users? Can you 100% rule out that not now in this moment an SAP user with a false identity infiltrates your production systems? Change now: It's about pro activity! But before you start now and start looking for the "identity converter" (which I really do not recommend!), I suggest that you take root of evil and proactively strengthen your RFC security. So if you want to find out more, I have the following 3 tips for you: 1) Our e-book about SAP RFC interfaces 2) Clean up our free webinar about RFC interfaces 3) Blog post about our approach to optimising RFC interfaces As always, I look forward to your feedback and comments directly below these lines!
Implementation of a highly available HANA data solution
SAP Basis is structured as a classic three-tier model. It contains the following components: Database layer (relational database management system) / Application layer (application server and message server) / Presentation layer (graphical user interface).
All of the above tasks have been part of SAP Basis Administration for decades. However, SAP software has changed a lot since the introduction of HANA in 2010, and with that, the SAP system administrator's job has changed as well. Here are some of the key differences:
With "Shortcut for SAP Systems" a tool is available that greatly facilitates some tasks in the SAP basis.
Providers include BasisTeam IT Service & Consulting AG, Phoron, Mindsquare and many others.
Here it is necessary not to overwhelm the own employees within the SAP basis and to keep the complexity of different topics and technologies manageable per capita.